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Abstract
The access control system of the ELETTRA
accelerators must guarantee that access to the machine
tunnels is allowed when safety conditions for personnel
are fulfilled.
The system is based on Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs) providing redundant logic in a fail-
safe configuration.
At present, the supervisor consoles of the system are
based on UNIX PCs running the Santa Cruz Operation
(SCO) operating system and X-11 applications. These
are being replaced by Microsoft Windows NT PCs,
equipped with a SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition) package, which is used for the development
of the new application programs.
1 THE ACCESS SYSTEM LOGIC
The ELETTRA access control system [1] is made of
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) supervised by
Santa Cruz Operation (SCO) UNIX PCs located in the
linac and storage ring control rooms. The system main
characteristics are fail-safe logic, redundancy and
ultimate operator authorization. The fail-safe logic
guarantees that if a fault occurs to the safety dedicated
equipment the machines are stopped in a safe status; the
redundancy assures that permission to enter a controlled
area is given only if at least two independent safety
conditions are fulfilled. The operator intervention is
eventually requested to provide the final assent during an
access procedure or to verify that nobody is present inside
the accelerator tunnels (patrol inspection) before starting-
up the machines after a shutdown.
The access control system considers the ELETTRA
facility as divided into three logical areas (fig. 1): the
linac, the Transfer Line (TL) and the Storage Ring (SR).
There are one entrance door to the linac (A1) and two
entrance doors to the ring (A2 and A3). The T1 and T2
doors delimit the TL. Three emergency exits are located
along the linac tunnel (E1, E2 and E3) and two around
the SR (E4 and E5); the SR entrance doors themselves
(A2, A3) can be used as emergency exits.
The linac and the SR, which are physically separated
by the TL, can be operated independently from each
other.
The access control system gets data from the TL and
SR beamstoppers, linac gun, linac and SR radio
frequency (RF), door proximity switches, entrance
equipment (badge reader controllers, key panels),
emergency and patrol buttons, beamlines. According to
the status of these inputs the PLCs permit or interdict the
operation of the accelerators and subsequently control the
access to the machine tunnels.
Access to the linac tunnel is allowed if its gun and the
RF accelerating sections are switched off. Access to the
SR tunnel is permitted if the beam has been dumped and,
in case the linac is on, the beamstoppers placed along the
underground section of the TL are closed. Access to the
TL (through T1 or T2) is allowed only if both the linac
and SR are switched off.
The beam dump in the SR is performed through a
double action: a short interruption of the RF cavities
driving signal and the closure of the SR beamstopper.
Figure 1: Logical areas
The access procedure for entering the accelerators
during a stand-by period consists of four successive steps:
- the entering person presents his badge to the
automatic badge reader; if the accelerator is switched off
and the badge identifier was pre-loaded in the list of
authorized personnel, the system gives the first assent to
open the door;
- one of the keys on the panel close to the door is
automatically unlocked and the person takes it out;
- the control room operator, after recognizing the
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- the person enters, closes the door and deposits the
key into an internal panel.
Exit operations require similar steps, but with an
opposite sequence: the person takes the key out from the
internal panel, opens the door by pressing a button,
deposits the key in the external panel and presents the
badge.
During the shutdown periods free access is permitted
and all the doors are unlocked.
2 THE UPGRADE PROJECT
OBJECTIVES
The upgrade involves only the supervisor consoles
while the low level PLCs are not modified.
The main objectives of the upgrade project are:
- the use of a new hardware/software platform for the
supervisors, Y2K compliant, with improved graphic
interface and management tools;
- the use of a RAD (Rapid Application Development)
environment, to facilitate the development of the
application software and Graphic User Interface
(GUI);
- the use of Local Area Network (LAN) PC cards able
to run both the Sinec H1 and the ‘standard’ TCP/IP
protocols, in view of future upgrades of the PLCs;
- to improve the diagnostics for the operators.
3 HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE
The new hardware architecture is shown in fig. 2.
Figure 2: Hardware Architecture
There are three Siemens Simatic S5 PLCs connected to
two supervisors through a dedicated Ethernet network
running the SINEC H1 Siemens proprietary protocol.
The badge readers (from Schlage Electronics) are
connected in a redundant way to both the PLCs and,
through a serial line, to the supervisors.
The supervisors are Hewlett-Packard KAYAK XAs
PCs. The SR control room PC, configured as a server, is
equipped with a SINEC H1 Applicom PCI 2000ETH
card. The other PC, which is installed in the linac control
room, is connected to the server PC by means of the main
plant Ethernet network running the TCP/IP protocol.
4 SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
The access control system has a two level software
architecture:
- the lower level is in charge of automated tasks,
performed by the PLCs.
These tasks are the acquisition of signals and
interlock signals from sensors, micro-switches, etc.;
transmission of commands to the actuators; automatic
interlock command transmission.
- the upper level is in charge of the supervision of the
various areas and of the access management. The two
PCs connected in a Client/Server configuration via
the main plant Ethernet network carry out these tasks.
The main guidelines followed in the choice of the PC
software are:
- adoption of an Open Architecture, carried out
through both 'de facto' and officially approved
standards;
- availability of a modular environment for the
development of applications and easy maintenance.
The Microsoft (MS) Windows NT has been eventually
selected as the basic operating system and the CUBE [2]
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA),
from Orsi, as the modular development environment.
The CUBE system (fig. 3):
- is developed upon MS Windows NT and based on the
MS DNA (Distributed interNet Application)
architecture;
- is equipped with a native Client/Server architecture;
- is highly scalable;
- supports commercial standards, such as OLE, DDE,
ODBC, OPC, IEC 1131-3;
- provides a large MS Windows NT driver library,
which can be expanded to custom interfaces by the
use of dedicated development tools;
- allows to install an hot back-up server;
- is characterised by a process data server made of the
Real Time Data Base (RTDB), Alarm Data Base
(ADB) and Process Data Base (PDB);
- has a powerful environment for the development of
application modules (data processing and control
logic, Application Programming Interface (API) to
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integrate external applications, real-time
communication drivers);
- provides special modules for designing and running
synoptic interfaces (Graphic Monitoring System
(GMS) module in Development (GSMD) and
Runtime (GSMR) versions);
- features robust debugging tools.
Figure 3: Server PC software architecture
4.1 Requested Features
The main features requested by the access control
application are:
- synoptic functionality;
- Data Base operation (list of authorized personnel, list
of people present inside the tunnel);
- control logic made of 'finite state machines' gathering
data from the PLCs, the badge reader controllers and
the Man-Machine Interface (MMI);
- logging of events.
4.2 Specific Problems
As far as the Data Base management is concerned, it
was necessary to consider the following needs:
- the lists have to be readable and changeable by
qualified personnel through permission passwords;
- any change in the lists has to be transferred to the
badge reader controllers, which hold a local copy of
them;
- the control logic can interrogate the lists to check
access permission conditions.
The following issues had to be considered for the
communication with the badge reader controllers:
- the controllers use an ASCII half-duplex protocol for
the transmission of the badge read data to the PCs;
- the controllers use an XMODEM-CHECK protocol
for the reception of data from the PC's.
For the reasons above, the standard CUBE driver could
not be adopted, and an application external to the
SCADA had to be developed. This application, while
waiting for events from the serial lines, has to interface
with the control logic and analyze possible changes in
the Data Base to automatically update the badge reader
controller lists in case of changes.
4.3 Adopted Solutions
As the Data Base is small and seldom accessed, the
CUBE Track Data Base oriented module was not
adopted. A dedicated solution based on the IBM DB2
Universal Data Base was chosen.
Two applications (fig. 3), called Account Manger and
Attendance Manager, were written to read and edit the
Data Base lists. These were developed using the Visual
Builder available with the IBM Visual C++ 4.0. Both
applications can be launched from the main synoptic.
The main control logic tasks for the access to the
machine through the A1, A2 and A3 doors were
developed taking advantage of the CUBE Data Engine
(DE) environment. Each task is dedicated to one of the
doors and uses the RTDB to interface with the PLCs, the
MMI, the badge reader controllers, the Data Base and to
log alarms.
The specific applications for the dialogue with the
badge reader controllers are based on the IBM Visual
Age C++. They are interfaced with the RTDB through
some Orsi DLL.
5 CONCLUSIONS
A specific project has been defined at the beginning of
1999 for the upgrade of the ELETTRA access control
system. The use of an off-the-shelf SCADA product has
minimized project times providing an effective
environment for the development of the application
software. Changes in the underlying low level software
running on the PLCs were negligible.
The upgraded ELETTRA access control system has
been successfully tested during the last two weeks of
September and will be definitively installed during the
shut-down period of November.
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